Identifying European monetary policy interactions : French and Spanish system with German variables by Kim, Soyoung
IDENTIFYING
EUROPEAN
MONETARY POLICY
INTERACTIONS:
FRENCH AND
SPANISH SYSTEM
WITH GERMAN
VARIABLES
Soyoung Kim
Banco de España - Servicio de Estudios
Documento de Trabajo nº 9811
IDENTIFYING 
EUROPEAN 
MONETARY POLICY 
INTERACTIONS: 
FRENCH AND 
SPANISH SYSTEM 
WITH GERMAN 
VARIABLES 
Soyoung Kim (*) 
(*) This paper was made whilst I was a visiting research fellow ant the Banco de Espana. Corres· 
pondence address: Department of Economics, 225b, DKH, 1407 W. Gregory Dr., Urbana, IL 
61891, e-mail:kimll@Staff.uiuc.edu. J thank Enrique Alberola, Pierfederico Asdrubali, Juan 
Ayuso. David L6pez, Eva Ortega, Etsuro Shioji, Javier Valles, and Jose Vifials for helpful dis­
cussion and comments, and Francisco de Castro Fernandez for data collection. 
Banco de Espana - Servicio de Estudios 
Documento de Trabajo n' 9811 
In publishing this series the Banco de Espana seeks to disseminate 
studies of interest that will help acquaint readers better 
with the Spanish economy. 
The analyses, opinions and findings of these papers represent 
the views of their authors; they are not necessarily those 
of the Banco de Espana. 
The Banco de Espana is disseminating some of its 
principal reports via INTERNET and INFO ViA. 
The respective WWW server addresses are: 
http://www.bde.es and http://www.bde.inf. 
ISSN: 0213-2710 
ISBN: 84-7793-612-9 
Oep6sito legal: M. 19179-1998 
Imprenta del Banco de Espana 
Abstract 
This paper develops the "identified V AR" models of France and Spain with German 
monetary variables to identify monetary policy shocks during the period when the 
exchange rate is controlled mostly by the ERM. Different identifying assumptions on the 
contemporaneous policy interactions are experimented. The imp1,llse responses to 
monetary policy shocks and estimated parameters of monetary reaction function suggest 
that the identification scheme implying unilateral contemporaneous reaction of non­
German monetary policies to the exchange rate against DM and the German iJl\erest rate 
and the identification scheme implying contemporaneous reactions of non-German 
monetary authority and the German interest rate to the bilateral exchange rates seem 
reasonable identifying assumptions in these countries. Regarding exchange· rate 
stabilization or policy interactions in a general sense, the results suggest that the FFIDM 
and the PtaslDM exchange rates are stabilized mostly by French and Spanish monetary 
policy (more vigorously by Spanish monetary authority). Regarding the sources of the 
nominal exchange rate fluctuations, the French and Spanish monetary policy shocks are 
the major sources of the fluctuations of the FFIDM and the ·PtaslDM exchange rates 
(larger contribution in Spain). This resull, together with moderate contribution of German 
interest rate shocks on the FFIDM and PtaslDM exchange rate fluctuations, can be 
interpreted as a result of the different magnitude of exchange rate stabilization in different 
countries. 

1. Introduction 
There has been extensive research to develop empirical models that identify 
monetary policy shocks. This literature uses V AR models with different plausible 
identifying restrictions to identify monetary policy shocks the basic effects of which are 
consistent with commonly shared prior beliefs. This paper applies the current 
developments in this literature to the European countries - France and Spain for the 
period in which the exchange rate is controlled mostly by the ERM. 
After classical works in this area (for example, Friedman and Shwartz (1963), 
Sims (1972), and Sims (1980a and b)), most initial contributions to this literature are 
developed by examining the U.S. economy, for example, Bemanke and Blinder (1992), 
Strongin (1995), Gordon and Leeper (1994), Eichenbaum (1992), Christiano and 
Eichenbaum (1992), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996), Sims and Zha (1995), 
Bemanke and Milhov (1995). This research finds the series of puzzles (most notably, the 
"price puzzle" and the "liquidity" puzzle). The nature of this puzzle is the dynamic 
responses of the identified monetary policy shocks are different from our widely shared 
priors on the basic effects of monetary policy shocks. In the U.S. economy using closed 
economy models, some consensus on the effects and identification scheme has been 
reached to some degree after resolving those puzzles.! 
After the initial period of examining the U.S. economy within a closed economy 
setup, the literature has been developed to consider open economies and non-US 
countries (for example Sims (1992), Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), Grilli and Roubini 
(1994), Kim (\996), Kim and Roubini (1995), Cushman and Zha (1995)), again 
producing and resolving some puzzles, notably, the "exchange rate" puzzle and the 
conditional "forward discount bias puzzle. ''2 
Note that most puzzles in this literature can be resolved by making the identified 
policy shocks "exogenous" or by reasonably specifying systematic reactions of monetary 
policy (monetary reaction function). For example, the "price puzzle" was resolved by 
I See Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996) for the unifying framework and summarizing the consensus. See also 
Introduction of Kim (1996) for the summary of this literature. 
2 See Grilli and Roubini (1996) for the summary of the literature related to the effects of exchange rate. 
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considering systematic reactions of monetary policy to inflationary pressure which had 
not been specified before.3 As a result, the identified monetary policy shocks become 
exogenous to inflationary pressure, which monetary authority systematically reacts to. So, 
specifying reasonable systematic reactions of monetary authority and making the 
identified policy shocks as exogenous are essential in identifying monetary policy 
shocks' 
Back to the developments of the literature, most past open economy models has 
been used the U.S. variables as the world variables, for example, Eichenbaum and Evans 
(1995) and Kim and Roubini (1995). One possible problem of previous research in 
directly applying to non-German European countries is that Germany, especially the 
German monetary policy or the German monetary variables have great influence on the 
non-German European countries. To identify exogenous domestic monetary policy 
shocks in these countries, it seems essential to consider policy reactions to German 
monetary variables. Furthermore, considering that most countries are within the ERM, 
and that the ERM may be considered as the system where each country pegs their 
currency to DM, it is essential to consider policy reactions to the exchange rate against 
DM and the German interest rate. Therefor, I try to construct a model including German 
monetary variables explicitly in the model to identify exogenous monetary policy shocks 
in non-German European countries. S6 
Then, how can we model the interaction between non-German monetary policy 
and German monetary policy, especially in stabilizing their bilateral exchange rate? In 
3 See Sims (1992) and Sims and Zha (1995) 
4 See Kim (1996) for further discussion. 
S On the other hand, since the major focus of this paper is identifying (non-German) exogenous 
monetary policy shocks, and examine the policy interactions, the general dependence of non-German 
economy to Germany may cause little problem. For example, there may not be much problem of not 
including German price and output directly in the model (to identify German real sector shocks) as long as 
the (non-German) price and output and German monetary variables well-capture the movements of German 
real sector shocks. Those variables will well-capture the movements of German real sector shocks, then our 
identified monetary policy shocks will be exogenous to German real sector shocks since they are exogenous 
to non-German price and output and German monetary variables. 
However, this may cause some problem of interpreting German interest rate shocks as representing 
German monetary policy shocks. I will discuss this point again in Section 6. 
6 There have been some previous works for non-German European countries including German monetary 
variables in the model, for example, Kim (1996) constructed a model for Italy, France, and the U.K. where 
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this paper, I experiment different hypotheses on contemporaneous policy interactions. 
And based on these models' estimated structural parameters (whether they can be 
interpreted as stabilization movements) and the dynamic responses (whether the 
responses to monetary policy shocks can match the basic effects of monetary policy 
shocks), we infer which model is more reasonable. Based on those models, we examine 
the effects of monetary policy shocks. Then, the results are compared to the previous 
research that does not consider the Gennan variables explicitly. 
The above experiments suggest how to model contemporaneous monetary policy 
interactions. However, more interesting issue is analyzing policy interactions in general. 
For the current context, there are several interesting questions: which country tries to 
stabilize the bilateral exchange rate, non-German countries or Germany, especially during 
the ERM period? Do they respond to shocks destabilizing exchange rate? How do they 
respond to foreign monetary policy shocks? Does Germany care about intra-European 
exchange rates? We can answer these questions since we also identify monetary reaction 
functions in addition to monetary policy shocks. I try to answer this question by 
examining impulse responses to external structural shocks destabilizing exchange rate 
and inferring policy reactionsJ 
I examine two largest countries - France and Spain. France has been within the 
ERM for a reasonably long period. Though Spain joined the ERM in 1989, it may be 
interesting to compare the results with those of France since we expect more unilateral 
dependence of Spanish monetary policy on Germany.' 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, I summarize the identified 
V AR modeling method and present the basic identifying assumptions. In Section 3, I 
examine the estimated structural parameters and the impulse responses of monetary 
policy shocks to evaluate different models. In Section 4, I explore the extent of exchange 
rate stabilization from Gennany and non-Gennan countries by examining the impulse 
the German interest rate is included, and Shioji (1997) constructed a model for Spain where the PtasfDM 
exchange rate is considered explicitly. 
7 Related to these types of questions, Montalvo and Shioji (1997) analyzed the reactions af non-German 
countries to German monetary policy shocks. Smets (1997) also examines how much weights German and 
other European countries put on exchange rates. 
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responses. In section S, I examine the role of monetary policy shocks and compare to the 
previous research. In Section 6, I summarize our results and discuss the implications. 
2. Identification Scbeme 
2.1. Identified V AR Modeling. 
We assume the economy is described by a structural form equation 
( I )  G(L)YI=el 
where G(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L, YI is an nxl data vector, and el is 
an nx I structural disturbances vector. et is serially uncorrelated and var(e[)=A. A is a 
diagonal matrix where diagonal elements are the variances of structural disturbances, so 
structural disturbances are assumed to be mutually uncorrelated. 
We can estimate a reduced form equation (V AR) 
where B(L) is a matrix polynomial (without the constant term) in lag operator L and 
Var(UI)= l:. 
There are several ways of recovering the parameters in the structural form 
equations from the estimated parameters in the reduced form equation. Some methods 
give restrictions on only contemporaneous structural parameters. A popular and 
convenient method is to orthogonalize reduced form disturbances by Cholesky 
decomposition (as in Sims (1980a and b) and Bernanke and Blinder (1992) among 
others). However, in this approach to identification we can assume only a recursive 
structure, that is, a Wold-causal chain. Blanchard and Watson (1986), Bernanke (1986), 
and Sims ( 1 986) suggest a generalized method (identified V AR) in which non-recursive 
8 I also experiment another largest country, Italy, but I drop the results since the results are sensitive to the 
estimation period, which may be due to the currency crisis in early 90's. 
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structures are allowed while still giving restrictions only on contemporaneous structural 
parameters. 
Let GO be the coefficient matrix (non-singular) on LO in G(L), that is, the 
contemporaneous coefficient matrix in the structural form, and let GO(L) be the 
coefficient matrix in G(L) without contemporaneous coefficient GO. That is, 
G(L) = GO+ GO(L). (3) 
Then, the parameters in the structural form equation and those in the reduced form 
equation are related by 
(4) 
In addition, the structural disturbances and the reduced form residuals are related by 
(5) 
which implies 
(6) 
Maximum likelihood estimates of I\. and GO can be obtained only through sample 
estimates of L. The right-hand side of equation (6) has nx(n+l) free parameters to be 
estimated. Since L contains nx(n+ I)/2 parameters, we need at least nx(n+I)/2 restrictions. 
By normalizing n diagonal elements of GO to I 's, we need at least nx(n-l)l2 restrictions 
on GO to achieve identification. In the V AR modeling with Cholesky decomposition, GO 
is assumed to be triangular. However, in the generalized structural V AR approach GO can 
be any structure as long as it has enough restrictions. 
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2.2. Identification Scheme 
I include the minimum set of variables to examine the issue under consideration. 
The data vector is {R, M, CPI, IP, R(G), E('IDM)), where R is a short-term interest rate, 
M is a monetary aggregate, CPI is the consumer price index, IP is the industrial 
production, R(G) is the German short-term interest rate, and E('IDM) is the exchange rate 
expressed as units of domestic currency for one unit of German Mark. For monetary 
aggregate, I use M2 for France, ALP (similar to M4) for Spain since there are substantial 
documentation suggesting that those monetary aggregates afe intermediate targets in 
those countries during the most estimation period,9 
The interest rate, money, price, and output are well-known variables in monetary 
business cycle literature. These variables seem essential to identify monetary policy in 
any countries.1O The other variables, the German interest rate and the exchange rate 
against DM, are the minimum set of variables that are relevant to current analysis 
identifying monetary policy in relation to German monetary variables and considering 
policy interactions. In general, they are important variables for identifying monetary 
policy in European countries. During the estimation period, the exchange rate of France 
and Spain is mostly controlled by the ERM, which may be regarded as a peg to DM. 
Moreover, as a leader of ERM, German monetary variables affect the monetary policy 
actions in these countries. These German monetary variables are introduced to control for 
the component of domestic monetary policy that is a reaction to German monetary shocks 
or the value of domestic currency, which lead to inflationary outcome or destabilization 
of the exchange rate. 
The basic identification scheme is similar to the one that has been used by 
previous analysis which has been successful in identifying monetary policy shocks the 
basic effects of which are consistent with our widely shared priors, for example, Gordon 
and Leeper ( 1994) and Sims and Zha ( 1 995) for the U.S., Kim (1 996) and Kim and 
9 See Melitz (1991) and Banen et al (1990) for France and Ayuso and Escriva (1997) for Spain. 
]0 We may proceed with the model without money, but inclusion of money is essential to isolate monetary 
policy shocks and shocks from the financial market by adding monetary aggregate. 
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Roubini (1995) for the G-7 countries." On top of the basic identifying assumptions, 1 
consider different identifying assumptions on the policy interactions. 
The following is the restrictions on the contemporaneous structural parameters 
GO, based on e,=Gou,. 
I eMS l i 1 g" 0 0 g" g;6 UR 1 1 eF 1 0 uM I I g" g2l g" g16 I 1 ecPl 1=1 0 0 1 g" 0 0 liep] 1 (7) 
1 etp 1 0 0 0 0 0 utp I eE l  gst g" gS3 g" g" UE(\DM} I 
L eR'G} J Lg;, 0 0 0 g�s UR{G) J 
where eMS. eM' eCP]' e1P' eR(G)' eE(IDM) are the structural disturbances, that is, money supply 
shocks, shocks in financial or money market (or M shocks), CPI shocks, IP shocks, 
E(IDM) shocks, and R(G) shocks, respectively, and uR, UM' Ucp" UIP' UE(lDM)' and uR(G) are 
the residuals in the reduced fonn equations, which represent unexpected movements 
(given infonnation in the system) of each variable. 
Here, the l's, o's, and g's without '.' are the identifying restrictions that are the 
common restrictions for all models while g's with '*' are the identifying restrictions that 
are different across models. First, I will briefly explain the common restrictions. Before 
we explain the details of our identifying restrictions, it is worth noting again that the 
following relations are contemporaneous restrictions on structural parameter Go without 
further restriction on lagged structural parameters. 
The first equation is the money supply equation. It is assumed to be the reaction 
function of the monetary authority, which sets the interest rate after observing the current 
value of money and the exchange rate (and the German interest rate if g16 is non-zero) but 
not the current values of output and the price level. This assumption is based on the 
11 There may be some possibility that other structural shocks, rather than monetary policy shocks. may 
produce similar impulse responses to monetary policy shocks in those models, and the identified monetary 
policy shocks in those models may not represent the "true" monetary policy shocks. However. there have 
not been any serious challenge to the identification scheme suggesting this possibility and we do not have 
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assumption of information delays - data on money and exchange rates (and the German 
interest rate) are available within a month, but those on the output and the price level are 
not. 
The third and fourth equations represent the sluggish real sector. Real activity is 
assumed to respond to price and financial signals (interest rates and exchange rates) only 
with a lag. The interest rates, money, the U.S. interest rate, and the exchange rate are 
assumed not to affect the level of real activity contemporaneously. One motivation for 
this identifying assumption is that firms do not change their output and price 
unexpectedly in response to unexpected changes in financial signals or monetary policy 
within a month due to inertia, adjustment costs and planning delays. 
The second and fifth equations are block of arbitrage equations describing 
financial market equilibrium. In most past research, the fifth equation is regarded as an 
arbitrage equation describing exchange rate market, but the second equation is regarded 
as the money demand equation by imposing a zero restriction on g26., for example, Kim 
and Roubini (1995). Here, I do not impose any restrictions (but normalization) on the 
second equations. The monetary aggregates considered here are broad ones, and the 
demand for these financial assets may be influenced by exchange rate and foreign interest 
rate, especially when uncovered interest rate parity does not exactly holds.12 In general, 1 
interpret these two equations as financial market equations (money, financial assets, and 
exchange rate) and I do not give any clear structural interpretations. 
The assumptions on the second, third, fourth, and fifth equations representing two 
different sectors - the real sector and the financial sector - are the generalization of 
difference in the response of the financial sector and the real sector. That is, the financial 
sector is thought to respond quickly to the shocks (including real sector shocks) while real 
sectors are thought to respond sluggishly to the shocks. 
any alternative models that have been as successful as those (especially in non-US countries). Therefore, I 
proceed with those models. 
121n many cases, additional zero restriction on g26 does not change the result much. But in some cases, 
especially in France, with the zero restriction, the response of monetary policy shocks are difficult to be 
justified. In addition, in some cases, the estimated contemporaneous parameters are difficult to be 
interpreted as money demand equation. These results make me to generalize the second equation as one 
equation in a financial sector equation. 
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Finally, in the last equations, the German interest rate is contemporaneously 
exogenous to the domestic real variables and money. 
Next, I explain the different identifying assumptions on the policy interactions 
between domestic monetary policy, German interest rate, and exchange rate. Though I do 
not carefully identify monetary policy in Germany, I use the German interest rate as a 
proxy for the German monetary policy. The first hypothesis is that within a month, 
German monetary policy does not respond to monetary and exchange rate developments 
in the other countries. This amounts to the assumption that German interest rate is 
contemporaneously exogenous (zero restrictions on g61 and g6S). Depending on 
contemporaneous reaction of non-German countries to German interest rate, that is, the 
restrictions on gl6, (in addition to exchange rate), there are two different models. I call 
them the NG-RGE model (no German reaction, the German interest rate excluded) and 
the NG-RGI model (no German reaction, the German interest rate included). 
Before moving to other hypothesis, I briefly explain the restrictions on g16 In 
comparison to Kim and Roubini (1995) giving zero resttictions on the similar parameter. 
In a similar system, they did not allow contemporaneous reaction of the G-7 countries 
against the US interest rate while allowing contemporaneous reaction of the G-7 to the 
exchange rate against the U.S. The rationale for their identifying assumption is: within a 
month, monetary authority cares more about unexpected changes in exchange rate against 
the U.S rather than the unexpected changes in the U.S. interest rate per se, and within a 
month, the U.S. interest rate does not have additional information for non-U.S. monetary 
authorities after they consider their exchange rate against the U.S. dollar. In contrast, 
within the nearly fixed exchange rate regime of the ERM, the German interest rate may 
have additional within-a-month information in constructing a proper monetary reaction 
function of non-German European countries. For example, if the monetary authority 
increases the interest rate very quickly in response to a German interest rate increase and 
the following exchange rate depreciation, then exchange rate will be back to the original 
value shortly. Then, the monthly average data will show small exchange rate depreciation 
but large interest rate increases, which may not capture reactions of the monetary 
authority very well. If we allow contemporaneous reaction to -the German interest rate, 
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then since similar increases in the German interest rate are observed, the monetary 
reaction function would capture the reactions better. So, I also experiment with the 
system including the German interest rate. 
The alternative hypothesis is that the German monetary authority cares about the 
financial developments in other countries, especially the exchange rate against them, 
within a month. This amounts to allowing feedback from the exchange rate (and non­
German interest rate) in the German interest rate equation, which implies no restrictions 
on g65 (and g61). I consider three cases. First, both authorities react to the exchange rate, 
but not the interest rate of the other - zero restrictions on g16 and 861. I call this the SG­
RSE model (symmetric German reaction, interest rates are excluded). Second, both 
authorities react to both exchange rate and the interest rate of the other, which implies no 
zero restrictions on g16, 861 and g6S -. the SG-RSI model (symmetric German reaction, 
interest rates are included). Third, non-German monetary authorities react more quickly 
(allowing reactions to both interest rate and exchange rate), but the German monetary 
authority reacts also (allowing reactions to only exchange rate), which implies zero 
restrictions on g16 - the PG model (partial German reaction). 
In summary, I consider five different models depending on German reactions to 
financial developments in non-German country and contemporaneous extra information 
on current interest rate. 
All variables were used in logarithm form except for interest rates. Complete 
seasonal dummies were used in all estimations. Monthly data are used. For France, I 
consider the period of ERM, from 79:3 13 For Spain, I consider the period when the Bank 
of Spain cares about the exchange rate developments, from 1984.14 I used different lag 
structures for the different length of the estimation periods.1S 
13 For France, the estimation period is 79:3-95:12. 
14 The estimation period is 1984-1995. See Ayuso and Escriva (1997) for the documentation of 
developments of Spanish monetary policy. 
15 I use { I,2,3,4,6,12} for France and {1.3.6,12} for Spain. Different lag structure does not change the 
r�sults much. Since the estimation period is short, using including more number of lags does not make much 
sense. By including the 12th lag, I try to capture some long run effects. And the lag-length test suggests that 
the first lag is very significant in all estimation. As a rule of thumb, for each estimation, I include the 
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3. Estimates of the Structural Parameters and Impulse Responses to Monetary 
Policy Shocks 
In this section, I examine which models show reasonable estimates of structural 
parameters of monetary reaction functions and reasonable impulse responses to monetary 
policy shocks. First, I examine whether the estimated structural parameters can be 
interpreted as the monetary authority's reaction to stabilize the exchange rate. When the 
estimated structural parameters are difficult to be interpreted as an exchange rate 
stabilization, [ regard the model as mis-specified. For example, when the estimates of glS 
and gl6 show the positive signs, which are interpreted as the exchange rate dis­
stabilization, [ regard the model as mis-specified since [ do not find any plausible reason 
that the monetary authority tries to systematically destabilize the exchange rate 
contemporaneously." Second, [ examine whether the impulse responses to monetary 
policy shocks can match the basic effects of monetary policy shocks. 
3.1. Estimates of the Structural Parameters in Monetary Reaction Functions 
In Table 1, 1 report the estimated coefficients for the monetary reaction functions 
and the German interest rate equation for the French models." The numbers in the 
parenthesis are standard errors. The estimated values of gl2 and gil show the negative 
sign in all cases. This implies that the monetary authority increases the interest rate when 
it observes an increase in the monetary aggregate and an exchange rate depreciation. That 
number of lags which makes the ratio of estimated parameters to observation roughly one·quarter. Results 
are not sensitive to the structure of the medium·term lags. 
16 This is a very informal way of selecting a model. First, if we include different variables, the result may 
change. Second, the standard errors of estimated parameters are very large. For the first cri ticism, I 
experimented some other models as in Section 6, but the major results do not change much. (Of course, 
further investigation may be worthwhile) 
There are some justifications against the second criticism. If the standard errors are so large that 
two different models produce almost similar results after counting standard errors of results, then there will 
be no problem of choosing one over the other (since the results are similar). If the results are quite different, 
then we would choose the results from one model over those from the other. In this case, we do need a 
criterion to choose one model over the other, and the sign of structurally interpretable parameters seem to 
be a reasonable reference. In addition, the large standard errors are due to multi·collinearity to the some 
extent. In this case, interpreting the estimates is more meaningful. 
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is, monetary authority takes a contractionary position when faced with inflationary 
pressures and tries to stabilize the exchange rate. 
For the other parameters, g" shows negative signs in the NG-RGl and the SG-RSI 
models, which implies that the monetary authority increases the interest rate (to stabilize 
the exchange rate) when it observes an increase in the German interest rate (which leads 
to an exchange rate depreciation), which is consistent with the stabilization of the 
exchange rate. However, in the PG model, the opposite sign shows, which suggests a 
possible mis-specification of the model. By a similar reasoning, if the German monetary 
authority tries to stabilize the exchange rate, we would observe the negative sign of go, 
and the positive sign of go,. In this respect, the PG and the SG-RSE model show the 
proper sign of g", but the SG-RSI model shows the opposite sign of g61 and g". In terms 
of the signs of the estimated coefficients, the PG and the SG-RSI model seem difficult to 
be justified. 
In Table 2, I report the estimated coefficients for the monetary reaction function 
and the German interest rate equation for the Spanish models. The estimated values of g" 
are negative in all cases but the values of gl2 are positive in most cases with large 
standard errors. The positive and not-significant g12 seems resulted from partial 
accommodation of monetary authority to money demand shocks, though it seems difficult 
to be verified in the present analysis." For the other parameters, the signs of all 
parameters are the same as the French case, which suggests the PG and the SG-RSI model 
seem difficult to be justified. Also notice that we find very large standard errors in the 
coefficients of the monetary reaction function in the NG-RGE model, the PG model, and 
the SG-RSI model. 
3.2. Impulse Responses to Monetary Policy Shocks 
17 I do not report other estimated parameters since they do not have any clear structural interpretations. 
18 This may be resulted from sample instability. When I estimate the model from 1986, the estimates show 
the negative sign. And there is a rational for estimating from 1986 since there is a documentation suggesting 
the Bank of Spain did not pay much attention to exchange rate until 1986 though it officially monitored the 
exchange rate from 1984. However, I do not shorten the period since the estimation period is still short even 
without dropping the period 1984 - 1986 . And major results do not change. 
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In Figure I, we display the estimated impulse responses to a contractionary 
monetary policy shocks. Each column of the figure gives the impulse responses (over 48 
months) to a one-standard-deviation monetary policy shock (monetary contraction). The 
responding variables are named at the far left of each row. The upper and lower dashed 
lines plotted in each graph are one-standard-error bands.19 The response graphs in a 
given row all have the same scale, with the maximum and minimum heights shown on 
any graph in the row noted to the left of the graph.20 In addition, for easier comparison 
between movements of the German interest rate and the domestic interest rate, I use the 
same scale for the responses of the German interest rate and the domestic interest rate. 
The impulse responses are very similar across models. In response to a monetary 
policy shock, initially the interest rate rises and money stock declines. The price level fall 
significantly for a long time. The output falls significantly, then go back to the initial 
level in about three or four years. We also find the impact appreciation of exchange rate. 
Then, the exchange rate depreciate over time. All these responses are consistent with 
widely shared priors on the effects of monetary policy. 
In Figure 2, I display the estimated impulse responses to a contractionary 
monetary policy shocks in Spain.21 Like French models, the impulse responses are very 
similar across models. In response to a monetary policy shock, initially the interest rate 
rises. Money stock declines few months later. The price level fall significantly for a long 
time. The output does not respond much. We also find the impact appreciation of 
exchange rate. These responses are consistent with widely shared priors on the effects of 
monetary policy. 
3.3. Comparison 
In France, it seems to be difficult to conclude which model can identify monetary 
policy shocks better since all responses are very similar across models. In terms of the 
19They were generated from three thousand draws by Monte Carlo Integration following Sims and Zha 
(1994); a Bayesian method which employs a Gaussian approximation to the posterior of Go. 
20 The scale of interest rate graph is the deviations in basis point, while the scale of other variables is 
percentage deviations. 
21 I cannot calculate the standard errors for the NG-RGE model since aO matrix is almost singular which is 
represented in huge standard errors in the monetary reaction function. 
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estimated coefficients, the PO and the SO-RSI models are difficult to be justified. If we 
examine the impulse responses more carefully. we find more similarity between the other 
models (and the similarity between the PO and the SO-RSI models). In these two models, 
the initial interest rate increases are negligible and the big drops in interest rate are found 
in few months. Though we can justify the big drops in the interest rate by deflation 
following monetary contraction, the· exchange rate response seems to difficult to be 
justified in the light of the responses of domestic interest rate and the Gennan interest 
rate, which makes me to give more credit on the other models. Similarly, the exchange 
rate movements of the NG-RGE model seems difficult to be justified since we observe 
larger depreciation with very small increase in interest rate (which last for a very short 
period). 
In Spain. responses from all models are very similar across models as in France. 
In terms of the estimated coefficients, the PO and the SO-RSI models are difficult to be 
justified. If we examine the impulse responses more carefully, we find the "delayed 
overshooting" (as in Eichenbaum and Evans (J 995)) in the PO model. So, I would give 
less credit to the PO model. Finally, considering huge standard errors, the NO-ROE 
model may be regarded as less satisfactory. 
In summary, the PO and the SO-RSI models show the wrong sign of the estimated 
structural parameters in interpreting them as policy reactions to stabilize the exchange 
rate. So, I will not consider results from these two models in the later analyses. Based on 
impulse responses, the NO-RGI and the SO-RSE models can deliver reasonable response 
as those of monetary policy shocks. The SO-RSE model also shows equally plausible 
responses while the NO-ROE model seems a bit less satisfactory. In the following 
sections, I will give more weights on the results of the NO-RGI and the SO-RSE models. 
On the other hand, similar impulse responses across models suggest that the small 
modifications on the interaction between monetary authority does not make much 
differences (especially the effects on the exchange rate), which in tum leads to the effects· 
of monetary policy presented here seems to be quite robust under different assumptions 
on the contemporaneous monetary interactions. 
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4. Policy Towards Exchange Rate Stability and Policy Interactions: Who Stabilizes 
the Excbange Rate? 
The different models under consideration make different assumptions on the 
contemporaneous policy interactions and on the contemporaneous policy reactions to 
exchange rate. But in many cases, impulse responses are similar across models, not 
sensitive to the slight modifications of the identifying assumptions. In relation to this 
result, I would like to emphasize that different identifYing assumptions on the 
contemporaneous policy interactions do not necessarily imply different implications on 
the policy interactions in general. First, the restriction that I impose is the zero restriction, 
but the opposite case is giving no restriction. So, the finding that not imposing a specific 
zero restriction produces more reasonable dynamics does not necessarily imply that the 
corresponding policy reaction is significant. Second, the contemporaneous restrictions are 
only on the contemporaneous reactions. To consider overall policy reactions, we should 
consider all lagged parameters in the monetary reaction functions. 
For example, suppose that the estimated go, shows the right sign (as a German 
reaction to stabilize exchange rate) and that the resulting impulse responses show bener 
responses to those responses from the model giving zero restrictions on �s, as responses 
to monetary policy shocks. This does not necessarily imply that the German role of 
stabilizing exchange rate is substantial (especially compared to the non-German's), 
though allowing contemporaneous reactions is important for identifYing monetary policy 
shocks. In this section, we explore the policy interactions and policy reactions towards 
exchange rate stabilization in a general sense. 
As I discussed previously, identifYing monetary policy shocks also implies 
identifying monetary reaction functions. Since we identify monetary reaction functions in 
the current analysis, we can answer the type of questions on the policy interactions. One 
problem is that the estimated policy reaction function is complicate, so it is difficult to 
interpret them. There are three possible ways to proceed. The first one is constructing 
more intuitive form of monetary policy rule. For example, Clarida and Gertler ( 1 996) 
transfonned the monetary reaction function to the one similar to the "Taylor Rule". The 
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second one is "counter-cyclical experiments." For example, Sims and Zha (1995) and 
Kim (1996) experimented different monetary policy rules by changing monetary reaction 
function. The third one is examining the estimated impulse responses, and infer the policy 
reactions. Many previous researchers interpreted impulse responses with policy reactions, 
though not many emphasized it. 
I proceed with the third way since the first and second ways need some additional 
assumptions. The first one needs a form of monetary policy rule which will give 
additional restrictions on the model. The second one needs an additional assumption that 
other structural parameters does not change, which may not be reasonable for some 
variables which are strongly affected by expectation changes (for example, the exchange 
rate). A possible problem of the third way is that sometimes it may be difficult to separate 
the responses of economy to structural shocks and responses of economy to policy 
reactions. But I proceed with this way, since sometimes we can infer policy reactions and 
this method does not need any further assumptions. 
From the impulse responses of monetary policy shocks in Figure I, we can 
examine the German policy reactions to non-German monetary policy shocks and the 
resulting exchange rate instability. We indeed observe a very small increase in the 
German interest rate for the first rew months (the NG-RGE, the NG-RGI, and the SG­
RSE models), which can be interpreted as exchange rate stabilization." But the changes 
in the German interest rate are very small compared to changes in the French interest rate, 
which results a large appreciation of the French Franc against the DM. (Notice that the 
scales of the French interest rate and the German interest rate are the sarne.) This suggest 
that there does not seem to be a strong reaction of the German monetary authority to the 
exchange rate destabilization due to the French monetary policy shocks. 
In contrast, the response of the French to the German interest rate shocks is 
noticeable. In Figure 3, I report the impulse response to the German interest rate shocks. 
In response to the German interest rate shocks, the French interest rate increases 
significantly. As a result, we cannot observe any strong depreciation of the FF against the 
2:! I do not have any clear interpretation on subsequent drop in the German interest rate. This may suggest 
that possible endogeneity of the identified monetary policy shocks, which makes me construct extended 
models later. 
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DM. Though other responses suggest that the German interest rate shocks may represent 
world negative supply shocks (I will discuss this possibility later), the French reaction to 
the German interest rate shocks in stabilizing the exchange rate seems remarkable. 
To further examine the possibility of the reactions of both monetary authorities to 
destabilizing movements in exchange rate, I report the impulse responses to the exchange 
rate shocks (from the fifth equation in (7» in Figure 4. This exchange rate shocks do not 
have any clear structural interpretation, but by construction, it represent the exchange rate 
movements that cannot be explained by any innovations in the model. So, they naturally 
represent shocks destabilizing the exchange rate. Again, we do not find much evidence 
that German monetary policy tries to stabilize the exchange rate, and most movements for 
exchange rate stabilization comes from the French monetary policy. In response to an 
exchange rate depreciation (FFIDM), the French interest rate goes up significantly 'on 
impact, which may be interpreted as a policy reaction to stabilize the exchange rate 
against the exchange rale depreciation. In contrast, we do not find much significant 
changes in the German interest rate, though we find a small decreases in the German 
interest rate, which can be interpreted as a policy reaction to stabilize the exchange rale 
against the DMIFF appreciation. 
For Spain, in response to Spanish monetary policy shocks, the German interest 
rate increases slightly, which suggests some stabilization but the magnitude is quite small. 
In response to German interest rate shocks, we find much larger stabilization movements, 
which is represented by subsequent increases in Spanish interest rate and not much effects 
on exchange rate (Figure 5). In response to exchange rate shocks, we find large 
stabilization movements from Spain, but very little or no German stabilization 
(depending on the model) (Figure 6). 
In summary, the exchange rate stabilization of Germany against French Franc and 
Spanish Pesetas seem quite minor. In most cases, we cannot find much evidence that 
Germany tries to stabilize the exchange rate against FF and Spanish Pesetas vigorously. 
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On the other hand. we observe substantial evidence that Spain and Gennany try to 
stabilize the exchange rate against the DM.23 
We can also compare the degree of exchange rate stabilization in Spain and 
France. Ifwe compare Figures 5 and 6, and Figures 7 and 8, we can see that the responses 
of Spanish interest rates are far larger than responses of French interest rates. These 
results suggest that the Spanish monetary authority is more vigorously stabilize the 
exchange rate, compared to the French monetary authority. 
This result is consistent with the finding by Montalvo and Shioji ( 1 997). They 
examined the responses of EMS countries to the German monetary policy shocks and 
found that much of the German monetary policy shocks are stabilized by non-German 
countries. Smets ( 1 997) suggested that France puts much weights on the exchange rate 
against DM, which is consistent with .the results of this paper. He also suggested that the 
Bundesbank puts much weights on intra-European exchange rate stabilization. Since he 
used composite index against many European countries, his finding is not necessarily 
inconsistent with my results. 
5. Variance Decompositi9n 
Based on the previous models, we can examine the role of monetary policy shocks 
and the German interest rate shocks on the fluctuation of the variables. The role of 
monetary policy shocks on output and price fluctuations has been widely documented in 
the previous research, for example, Gordon and Leeper (1994), Sims and Zha ( 1 994) for 
the US, Kim ( 1 996) and Kim and Roubini ( 1 995) for the G-7 countries, Jareno, 
Sebastian, and Valles ( 1 997) and Shioji (1 997) for Spain. And the result of this paper 
does not produce much difference. I repon the results in Tables 3 and 4. 
As can be easily seen in the tables, monetary policy shocks are not the major 
sources of output and price fluctuations. In France, they explain 10 - 20 % of output 
fluctuations and less than 1 0  % of price fluctuations. These results are consistent with 
Kim ( 1 996) and Kim and Roubini (1 995). In Spain, monetary policy shocks explain 6 - 16  
23 I t  may b e  interesting t o  policy reactions t o  other structural shocks in the model. But from responses to 
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% of output fluctuations and 1 9  - 30 % of price fluctuations at the peak. These results are 
consistent with Jareno, Sebastian, and Valles ( 1 997) and Shioji ( 1 997). 
Then I examine the role of monetary policy shocks and Gennan interest rate 
shocks on the exchange rate fluctuations. The domestic monetary policy shocks are the 
major sources of the nominal exchange rate fluctuations. In France, the contribution is 32 
- 54 % at the peak. In Spain, the contribution is even larger, 5 1 -82 % at the peak, which 
suggest that the Spanish monetary policy shocks are the dominant source of the PtaslDM 
exchange rate. The Gennan interest rate shocks also explain some of nominal exchange 
rate fluctuations. They explain more or less 10 % of the FFIDM fluctuations and more or 
less 20 % the PtasIDM at the peak. If we interpret the German interest rate shocks as the 
German monetary policy shocks, then both monetary policy shocks explain more than 
half of the nominal exchange rate fluctuations. 
One interesting result is that domestic monetary policy shocks and German 
interest rate shocks explain quite different proportion of the exchange rate fluctuations in 
different countries. The Spanish monetary policy shocks have a very large contribution. 
The French monetary policy shocks explain a lot, but less than the Spanish monetary 
policy shocks. German interest rate shocks less than the French and Spanish monetary 
policy shocks. 
First possible explanation is that the size of typical monetary policy shocks are 
different across countries, but this does not seem to explain the difference. In the Figures 
I and 2, we can see that the typical monetary policy shocks are represented as about .2 
basis point increases in interest rate (based on the NG-RGI model). From Figures 3 and 5, 
we can also find that the typical German interest rate shocks is a similar magnitude 
increase in the Gennan interest rate. Therefore, the size of typical monetary policy shocks 
do not seem able to explain the different contributions across countries. 
There are some other possible explanation like different transmission mechanism 
in different countries and different size of other structural shocks in different countries, 
which is not verified in current analysis. 
other shocks, it seems difficult to separate the policy reactions. 
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Here, I give an interpretation of this result related to policy interactions or the 
different magnitude of exchange rate stabilization in different countries. Germany do not 
stabilize much of exchange rate disturbances due to French and Spanish monetary policy 
shocks against French Franc and Spanish Pesetas. In contrast, France and Spain stabilize 
the exchange rate disturbances due to German interest rate shocks. As a result, the French 
and Spanish monetary policy shocks explain much portion of exchange rate fluctuations 
while German interest rate shocks explain less.24 
In addition, the larger contribution of the Spanish monetary policy shocks 
(compared to that of the French monetary policy shocks) may be interpreted as a result of 
larger degree of exchange rate stabilization in Spain. That is, since Spanish monetary 
authority vigorously stabilize exchange rate movements resulted from other structural 
shocks, the contribution of other structural shocks become smaller and that of monetary 
policy shocks become larger. 
6. Extended Models 
I considered some extended models to examine the robustness of previous results. 
As we may infer from the responses of the German interest rate shocks, the German 
interest rate shocks may not represent the German monetary policy shocks, rather it may 
represent the endogenous response to the world shocks, especially world negative supply 
shocks. So, first, I consider the model including a proxy of the world negative supply 
shocks - the world oil price. A similar system is studied by Kim and Roubini ( 1 997). 
Second, I develop a model including the US interest rate. By making the US interest rate 
as contemporaneously exogenous, and making the German interest rate shock as 
contemporaneously endogenous to the US interest rate, I try to exclude the endogenous 
response to the world shocks. A similar system is studied by Kim ( 1 996). Third, I include 
the US dollar-German exchange rate since there are some evidence that the German 
monetary policy respond to the exchange rate." A similar system is studied by Shioji 
24 Similar explanation was given by Montalvo and Shioji ( 1997) interpreting the contribution of the 
Gennan monetary policy shocks. 
25 This point is documented by Clarida and Gertler (\ 996) and Smets (1997). 
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(I 997). These three models also helps further exclude systematic responses of non­
German countries' monetary policy to identify exogenous monetary p�licy shocks. 
On the other hand, the asymmetric result between Germany and non-German 
countries may result from the built-in asymmetry in the model. So, I construct a Gennan 
model where monetary variables of other countries are included additionally. This model 
itself may not be as attractive as the asymmetric model considered before, but I 
experiment this model to check the robustness of results under different built-in 
asymmetry in the model. 
I do find some identification schemes that can produce reasonable dynamics and 
estimates of monetary reaction functions in some cases, but in other cases, it is not easy to 
find an identification scheme for the extended model that can produce reasonable 
dynamics and estimates of structural parameters of monetary reaction functions. The 
results from the identification scheme that I experimented and that produced the plausible 
signs of estimated structural parameters and reasonable responses of monetary policy 
shocks are similar to the previous results. 
7. Conclusion 
I construct different models representing different identifying assumptions on 
contemporaneous policy interactions between non-Gennan European countries and 
Germany to identify monetary policy shocks in non-German European countries - France 
and Spain. Some identification schemes show the plausible value of the estimated 
structural parameters and deliver the reasonable dynamic responses of monetary policy 
shocks. Based on these models, I examine the role of monetary policy shocks in those 
countries. In addition, I examine which country tries to stabilize the intra-European 
exchange rate. 
The results on variance decomposition on output and price are consistent with the 
previous researchers' finding that monetary policy shocks are not the dominant sources of 
output and price fluctuations. The result on variance decomposition on the nominal 
exchange rate suggests that the French and the Spanish monetary policy shocks are the 
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major sources of the fluctuations of the FFIDM and Ptas/DM exchange rate, while the 
German interest rate shocks have a moderate contribution to the fluctuations of the 
exchange rates. On the other hand, the impulse responses to the non-German monetary 
policy shocks, the German interest rate shocks, and the exchange rate shocks suggest that 
the French and Spanish monetary policies stabilize the exchange rate against the DM 
vigorously (the lesser degree in the France) and that the German monetary policy 
stabilizes the FFIDM and PtaslDM exchange rates very weakly. The cross country 
differences in the magnitude of exchange rate stabilization. which are inferred from the 
evidence on the impulse responses, may explain the cross country differences in the 
contribution of monetary policy shocks on the exchange rate fluctuations, which are 
inferred from the evidence on the variance decomposition. 
Another interesting result of ti\is paper is that slight modifications of identitying 
assumptions in the "identified V AR" models generate very similar responses in some 
cases. One of the previous critiques on the "identified V AR" models (compared to 
unrestricted V AR models) is that the result is sensitive to slight modifications of 
identitying assumption. But the results of French and Spanish models suggest that this is 
not necessarily the case. More specifically, the similarity on the effects on the price level 
and output is less surprising since the basic identification scheme has produced the 
similar results in the previous research. In contrast, the similarity of the effects on the 
exchange rate and the responses of policy authority seem to deserve more attention 
considering very different identitying assumptions on the contemporary policy 
interactions, which possibly result the substantial difference in the effects of monetary 
policy shocks, are assumed on the top of the basic identification scheme. 
Finally, by experimenting different identification schemes on contemporaneous 
policy reactions between non-Gennan cOlU1tries and Gennany, we can infer some 
interesting points in modeling monetary policy in non-German countries. In particular, the 
NG-RGI model and the SG-RSE model can deliver reasonable responses in all countrie�. 
This suggests that assuming contemporaneous unilateral reaction of non-Gennan 
countries to the exchange rate against OM and the Gennan interest rate and assuming 
contemporaneous reaction of non-Gennan countries and German interest rates to bilateral 
- 26-
exchange rates seem reasonable schemes to identify non-German monetary policy in 
association with German monetary variables. 
- 27 -

Table 1. Contemporaneous Coefficients on Monetary Reaction Function and 
German Interest Rate Equation, France 
No German Reaction Partial Symmetric 
Model NG-RGE NG-RGI PG SG-RSE SG-RSI 
info. on Rts R(G) excI. R(G) incl. R excI. R's excl. R's incl. 
zero rest. 61,65,16 61,65 61 16,61 no 
on 61,65,16 restrions 
g12 -20.3 -63.6 - 1 5 .56 -63.7 - 1 69.6 
sId. error 1 9. 7  86.4 25.46 103.2 333.0 
g15 -32 1 .2 -74.3 -25. 1 1  ·94.7 - 1 29.5 
sId. error 83.8 142.3 22.60 162.3 3 74. 7 
g16 --- -.28 .67 --- -3.01 
std. error --- .21  1 . 75 --- 5.45 
Ul --- --- -_. --- .74 
SId. error --- --- --- --- 1 . 1 0  
g65 --- --- 286.0 6.32 -29 .0 
sId error --- --- 528.3 17.33 72. 0 
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Table 2. Contemporaneous Coefficients on Monetary Reaction Function and 
German Interest Rate Equation, Spain 
No German Reaction Partial Symmetric 
Model NG-RGE NG-RGI PG SG-RSE SG-RSI 
info. on R's R(G) excl. R(G) incl. R excl. R's excl. R's incl. 
zero rest. 61,65,16 61,65 61 16,61 no 
on 61,65,16 rest. 
g12 8463 1 1 8.8 -4.36 48.2 565.5 
sId. error 1 16798 202.5 75.92 78. 4 4402.3 
g15 -5 191 - 1 55.5 -6.67 -60.8 -689.4 
sId. error 71620 263.5 3 7. 04 82. 9 5327.6 
gl6 --- -3.10 2.80 --- -24.8 
SId. error --- 4.32 3 0 1  --- 208.8 
U1 --- --- --- --- .37 
sId. error --- --- --- --- .43 
U5 --- --- 37.0 6.55 -3.36 
SId. error --- --- 51. 6 3.52 29. 7 
- 30 -
Table 3. Forecast Error Variance Decomposition due to Monetary Policy Shocks 
and the German Interest Rate Shocks in France 
I) Consumer Price Index (due to Monetary Policy Shocks) 
No German Reaction SYmmetric 
Model NG-RGE NG-RGI SG-RSE 
info. on R's RIG) excl. RIG) incl. R's excl. 
Zero rest. 61,65,16 61,65 16,61 
12 m 4.7 13 S) 3.8 14.S) 3.2 (2.8) 
24 m 7.1 (S.]) 7.2 17.4) 6.3 (S.7) 
48 m 9.0 (6.2) 1 1 .7 ( 1 0.7) 9.2 (6.6) 
2) Industrial Production (due to Monetary Policy Shocks) 
No German Reaction SYmmetric 
Model NG-RGE NG-RGI SG-RSE 
info. on R's RIG) excl. RIG) incl. R's excl. 
Zero rest. 61,65,16 61,65 16,61 
12 m 1 1 .6 (8.0) 1 8.6 (I 1 .0) 3.4 (2.S) 
24 m 1 3 .0 (9.0) 2 1 .S ( 12.9) 9.2 (6 6) 
48 m l OA (6. 1 \  1 7.7 ( 10.9) 22. 1 (8.2) 
3) Exchange Rate 
No German Reaction Symmetric 
Model NG-RGE NG-RGI SG-RSE 
info. on R's rumexcl. R(G) incl. R's excl. 
Zero rest. 61,65,16 61,65 16,61 
MS O m  2.6 12.2) 27.1 (16.4) 20.2 (13.5) 
6 m  S6. 1(l9.9) 30.6 (18.6) 42.2 (18.5) 
12 m 54.4(1 9.]) 32.1 ( I6.2) 44.2 (17.8) 
24 m 38.5(13.0) 23.8 (11 .3) 32A (14.1\ 
48 m 26.3( 1 1 .7) 16.8 (8.6) 22.0 ( 1 0.8) 
RiG) O m  3 1(2.7) 4.2 (2.8) 5.2 (3.2) 
6 m  3 .3 (2.S) 3.S (2.7) 8A (6.6) 
12 m 3.8 (2.S) 4.7 (4 1 )  6.9 (S.3) 
24 m S.6 (4.3) 6.7 (S.7) 8A (5.8) 
48 m 1 1 .7 (7.3) 9A (7.6) 9A (6.8) 
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Table 4. Forecast Error Variance Decomposition due to Monetary Policy Shocks 
and the German Interest Rate Shocks in Spain 
I) Consumer Price Index (due to Monetary Policy Shocks) 
No German Reaction Symmetric 
Model NG-RGE NG-RGI SG-RSE 
info. on R's R(G) excl. R(G) incl. R's excl. 
Zero rest. 61,65,16 61,65 16,61 
12 m 1 1 .2 19 . 1  ( 10.9) 30.0 ( 1 3.8) 
24 m 14.4 1 6.0 (I 1 .6) 26.9 (14.5) 
48 m 19.3 1 6.7 ( 1 3.3) 25.2 ( 1 4.3) 
2) Industrial Production (due to Monetary Policy Shocks) 
No German Reaction Symmetric 
Model NG-RGE NG-RGI SG-RSE 
info. on R's R(G) excl. R(G) incl. R's excI. 
Zero rest. 61,65,16 61,65 16,61 
12 m 0.9 2.6 (2.4) 6.2 (4.4) 
24 m 1 .7 6.2 (4.9) 8.3 (5.2) 
48 m 6.4 10.0(7. 1)  1 5.8 (7.5) 
3) Exchange Rate 
No German Reaction Symmetric 
Model NG-RGE NG-RGI SG-RSE 
info. on R's R(G) excl. R(G) incl. R's excl. 
Zero rest. 61,65,16 61,65 16,61 
MS O m  76.7 1 7.8 (13.� 49.2(21 .6) 
6 m  8 1 .9 67.7 (12.6) 5 1 .4 (22.2) 
12 m 59.4 49.0 (12.3) 43.6 (16.7) 
24 m 33 . 1  3 1 .4 (13.9) 37.7 (12.3) 
48 m 22.4 23.8113.4} 27.9113.6) 
R(G) O m  6.4 4.3 (3 .1) 3.2 (3.1) 
6 m  2.2 4.8(3 ·51 9.�(8.2t 
12 m 7.8 10.9 (7.3) 1 1 .7 (6.9) 
24 m 1 9.5 1 8.2 ( 1 15 )  20.9 ( 12.7) 
48 m 19.7  1 8.6 (I 1 .3) 24.1 ( 16 . 1 )  
- 32 -
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